Cleveland State Law Review
Volume 66

Issue 1

Note

12-31-2017

The "P" Word: Ohio Should Adopt the Uniform Premarital
Agreements Act to Achieve Consistency and Uniformity in the
Treatment of Prenuptial Agreements
Jenna Christine Colucci
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Family Law Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the State and Local Government Law
Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Jenna Christine Colucci, The "P" Word: Ohio Should Adopt the Uniform Premarital Agreements Act to
Achieve Consistency and Uniformity in the Treatment of Prenuptial Agreements, 66 Clev. St. L. Rev. 215
(2017)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss1/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

THE “P” WORD: OHIO SHOULD ADOPT THE
UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT TO
ACHIEVE CONSISTENCY AND UNIFORMITY IN
THE TREATMENT OF PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
JENNA CHRISTINE COLUCCI*
ABSTRACT
Throughout the United States, courts have used inconsistent standards for the
interpretation of prenuptial agreements. Under Ohio jurisprudence, courts are
concerned with protecting the vulnerable spouse, or the economically disadvantaged
party. This legal standard acknowledges the unique relationship of the parties to the
contract and will generally review the procedural and substantive components of the
prenuptial agreement. Conversely, other courts are weary of interfering with the
contractual freedom of the parties and will only invalidate a prenuptial agreement upon
a showing of fraud, duress, or misrepresentation. The Uniform Premarital Agreements
Act was drafted in 1983 to address the inconsistent treatment of prenuptial agreements
on a multi-jurisdictional basis. To date, twenty-seven states have adopted the Act.
Ohio’s adoption of the Act would clarify the rights and responsibilities of parties to
prenuptial agreements. In addition, subsequent adoption of the Act in all states would
guarantee reliable prenuptial agreements which could withstand judicial scrutiny in all
United States jurisdictions.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Husband speaking to his lawyer: “Are you telling me that I need a lawyer in
Nevada, where our marriage took place, another lawyer in Ohio, where we signed the
prenuptial agreement, and a third lawyer in New York, where my ex and our children
live? Is that what you are saying?” This dramatic conversation is not a legal stretch
from the truth. In our modern and mobile society, dissolving marriages and the
subsequent enforcement of prenuptial agreements can create multi-jurisdictional
nightmares as portrayed herein. To exacerbate this issue, courts in various jurisdictions
often apply competing standards when interpreting prenuptial agreements. These
distinctive standards, which govern prenuptial agreement interpretations, contribute
significantly to the uncertain and non-uniform treatment of prenuptial agreements in
the United States.
To illustrate, in the 1970s, Dr. Frederick A. Simeone, a 39-year-old neurosurgeon,
married Catherine E. Walsh Simeone, a 23-year-old registered nurse, in
Pennsylvania.1 At the time, Mr. Simeone’s approximate annual income was $90,000.2
Mrs. Simeone, however, was unemployed.3 The day before the wedding, Mrs.
Simeone signed a prenuptial agreement prepared by her husband’s attorney without
the assistance of her own counsel.4 The agreement capped Mrs. Simeone’s spousal
support at $25,000, paid in weekly increments of $200. 5 In 1984, the parties
commenced divorce proceedings.6 Mrs. Simeone argued that the agreement was
unreasonable because she misunderstood the nature of alimony pendente lite7 when
she relinquished it in the agreement; thus, the agreement should not be enforced.8 The
lower court rejected her arguments. 9 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the
lower court’s ruling, finding that “the agreement was entered into after full and fair
disclosure of assets and that there was an absence of duress.” 10
1

Simeone v. Simeone, 551 A.2d 219, 224 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).

2

Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 163 (Pa. 1990).

3

Id.

4

Id.

5

Id.

6

Id.

7 Alimony pendente lite refers to spousal support payments paid during the pendency of a
divorce proceeding. CORDELL & CORDELL, P.C., What Is Alimony Pendente Lite?,
DADSDIVORCE.COM (Oct. 1, 2012), http://dadsdivorce.com/articles/what-is-alimony-pendentelite/.
8

Simeone, 581 A.2d at 164.

9

Id.

10

Id.
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Under Ohio antenuptial laws, Simeone would have been decided differently. In
Simeone, the court interpreted premarital agreements using the same principles applied
to other contracts; the terms of their agreements should bind spouses absent a showing
of fraud, misrepresentation, or duress. 11 Conversely, prenuptial agreements enforced
in Ohio “must meet certain minimum standards of good faith and fair dealing. 12 If the
premarital agreement is fair and reasonable under the circumstances, it will be deemed
enforceable.”13 Henceforth, unlike Simeone’s traditional, contractual interpretation
predicated on freedom of contracts, Ohio’s conservative standard requires compliance
with procedural and substantive mechanisms to protect a vulnerable spouse, to wit,
the economically disadvantaged party.14 Accordingly, under Ohio jurisprudence, the
court in Simeone would have considered facts such as, the close proximity between
the agreement’s execution and the wedding; the husband’s attorney’s role in drafting
the agreement; the inequality of bargaining power resulting from the husband’s
attorney’s role; the lack of independent counsel representing the wife; and, the
unreasonable nature of spousal support where a substantial disparity of income exists
between the parties.15
Considering these facts, an Ohio court may have concluded that the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the prenuptial agreement and the substantive provisions
of the agreement were unfair. Because Simeone rejected a reasonableness approach,
permitting the court to evaluate the reasonableness of such agreements, 16 an Ohio
court would likely have held the Simeone prenuptial agreement unenforceable for the
aforementioned reasons. Therefore, eliminating these competing standards and
adopting uniform standards would provide universal guidelines on the drafting and
interpretation of prenuptial agreements. Such uniformity would allow couples to
create binding, legal premarital contracts, likely to withstand judicial scrutiny across
multiple jurisdictions.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act (“UPAA”) in 1983 to address the inconsistent
treatment of prenuptial agreements on a multi-jurisdictional basis.17 To date, twentyseven states have adopted the UPAA, either in full or in some modified capacity. 18
The UPAA adopts accepted standards of existing state laws governing the
11

Id. at 165.

12

Zimmie v. Zimmie, 464 N.E.2d 142, 146 (Ohio 1984).

13

Id.

14

See, e.g., id. (focusing on the absence of independent legal counsel for the former wife
and her testimony that she did not understand the agreement); Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500,
504 (Ohio 1984) (“To require Wife to return from this opulent standard of living to that which
would be required . . . [by the agreement] could well occasion a hardship or be significantly
difficult for the former wife”).
15

See Simeone, 581 A.2d at 163–64.

16

Id. at 162.

17

Jill Heitler Blomberg, Unconscionability: The Heart of the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act, 15 AM. J. FAM. L. 131, 131 (2001).
18 Jeremy D. Morley, Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, INT’L PRENUPTIALS
AGREEMENTS—EXPERIENCED INT’L COUNS., http://www.internationalprenuptials.com/uniformprenuptial-agreements-act.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2016).
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enforcement of prenuptial agreements.19 Under these standards, prenuptial agreements
must be in writing, signed by both parties, and executed freely and voluntarily; they
also require that potential spouses have adequate knowledge of each other's property
and finances.20 The UPAA also provides a flexible framework by excluding nothing
from the scope of the agreement except criminal or unconscionable matters. 21 Ohio
has neither adopted nor introduced any version of the UPAA; therefore, Ohio’s
common law and applicable state statutes govern enforcement of prenuptial
agreements executed in Ohio.22
This Note argues that Ohio’s adoption of the UPAA would clarify the rights and
responsibilities surrounding prenuptial agreements and that subsequent adoption of
the Act in all jurisdictions would facilitate uniformity through consistent treatment of
prenuptial agreements across state lines. Many couples in the United States reside in
several states during their marriage.23 Moreover, prospective spouses are increasingly
aware of the need to settle marital issues between themselves before marriage.24 Thus,
if Ohio and all states adopt the UPAA, prospective spouses will no longer worry about
renegotiating their prenuptial agreements whenever they move to a new jurisdiction.
Part I of this Note analyzes two Supreme Court of Ohio cases involving prenuptial
agreements and the law derived therefrom. Part II discusses the focus of Ohio’s
prenuptial agreements—specifically, the protection of the vulnerable spouse—and
compares it to the UPAA’s focus—that parties should be free, within broad limits, to
choose the financial terms of their marriage.25 Part III sets forth the UPAA’s accepted
state standards and flexible framework and argues that Ohio should adopt the UPAA
because it will enable prospective spouses to legally and contractually organize their
affairs in a valid and binding instrument of law. 26 Finally, Part IV will rebut the
prevailing counterargument that the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreement Act
(“UPMAA”) “achieve[s] greater consistency in the way in which the states enforce
premarital agreements,”27 but finds that many states may be reluctant to adopt the
UPMAA because a majority of these jurisdictions already enacted laws treating
prenuptial agreements as ordinary contracts.
19

Why States Should Adopt UPAA, UNIF. L. COMM’N—NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON UNIF.
LS.,
ST.
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Why%20States%20Should%20Adopt%20U
PAA (last visited Nov. 3, 2016) [hereinafter ULC, Why States Should Adopt UPAA].
20

Id.

21

Id.

22

Kristina Otterstrom, Prenuptial Agreements in Ohio: A Look at the Basics of Prenuptial
Agreements in Ohio, DIVORCENET.COM, http://www.divorcenet.com/resources/prenuptialagreements-ohio.html (last visited Aug. 27, 2017).
23

ULC, Why States Should Adopt UPAA, supra note 19.

24

Id.

25

UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).

26

ULC, Why States Should Adopt UPAA, supra note 19.

27

UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2012); Carlyn
S. McCaffrey, Except as Provided in Article Five, I Endow Thee with All My Worldly Goods—
The New Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreement Act, NAECP J. EST. & TAX PLAN., July–
Sept. 2014, at 11.
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II. BACKGROUND
A prenuptial agreement is a “written contract between two people who are about
to marry, setting out the terms of possession of assets, treatment of future earnings,
control of the property of each, and potential division if the marriage is later
dissolved.”28 Currently, every state recognizes the validity of divorce-focused
prenuptial agreements.29 Until the mid-1970s, most courts held that premarital
agreements and other contracts made “in contemplation of divorce” were
unenforceable, reasoning that the “agreements were void either [(1)] because they
purported to alter the state-imposed terms of the status of marriage, which were not
subject to individual alteration, or (2) because they tended to encourage divorce.” 30
This theory of premarital agreements has changed considerably over the past thirty
years.31
Today, couples often execute a prenuptial agreement in preparation for divorce
rather than death.32 Moreover, society has witnessed an “increasing awareness among
prospective marital partners of the need to settle issues of property and income
between themselves before marriage.”33 As a result, “[sixty-three] percent of divorce
attorneys surveyed by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers said they had
seen an increase in the number of prenuptial agreements drafted in recent years.”34
Thus, the need for uniform standards and consistent treatment of prenuptial
agreements across state lines is a contemporary issue of premarital law.
A.

Prenuptial Agreement Reform

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the
UPAA to “remove substantial uncertainty as to the enforceability of all, or a portion,
of the provisions of [prenuptial] agreements.”35 Prior to its enactment, the protection
of the vulnerable spouse and the conventional, contractual freedom juxtaposition was
rampant; some courts interpreted prenuptial agreements in consideration of the
vulnerable spouse, while others adhered to conventional, contract law to guide the
interpretation and enforceability of prenuptial agreements. 36
For example, Georgia courts often invalidated a prenuptial agreement based on a
showing of three elements: “(1) was the agreement obtained through fraud, duress or
28

ROSEMARY DURKIN & TRISHA ZELLER, OHIO PROBATE § 3.02 (2d ed. 2017).

29

Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 158 (1998).
30

Id. at 150.

31

Id. at 148.

32

Id. at 149.

33

Premarital Agreement Act Summary, UNIF. L. COMM’N—NAT’L CONF. COMM’RS ON
UNIF.
ST.
LS.,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Premarital%20Agreement%20Act (last
visited Nov. 3, 2016) [hereinafter ULC, Summary].
34 Kelli B. Grant, Prenups: Not Just for the 1 Percent, CNBC.COM (Jan. 20, 2015),
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/01/20/prenups-not-just-for-the-1-percent.html.
35

Peter T. Lesson & Joshua Pierson, Prenups, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 367, 371 (2016).

36

Id.
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mistake, or through misrepresentation or nondisclosure of material facts? (2) Is the
agreement unconscionable? (3) Have the facts and circumstances changed since the
agreement was executed, so as to make its enforcement unfair and unreasonable?” 37
Such a standard is analogous to Ohio’s current prenuptial agreement law, protecting
the vulnerable spouse.38 However, in Oregon, courts favor the enforcement of
prenuptial agreements and, because of the fiduciary relationship of the parties, hold
prospective spouses to a “punctilious standard of performing their agreement.”39 For
example, in In re Moore’s Estate,40 the former husband relinquished his rights to the
wife’s real property. The issue was whether the parties to an intended marriage
contract may waive their statutory rights to the disposition of real and personal
property.41 The court concluded that “such waiver can be effected by a prenuptial
agreement which is otherwise valid.”42 This stringent interpretation of the validity of
the prenuptial agreement did not consider whether the former husband had access to
independent legal counsel or whether he understood the rights that he was
relinquishing.43 This interpretation is analogous to the contractual freedom standard,
ignoring the reasonableness of the agreement.44
Prior to the enactment of the UPAA, the enforceability of prenuptial agreements
was uncertain. Prenuptial agreements were held to a higher standard than conventional
contracts; they had to pass both procedural and substantive fairness tests under
doctrines such as unconscionability, fraud, and duress. 45 A majority of courts required
evidence that the parties consulted with independent legal counsel, that the parties
disclosed their monetary assets, that any spousal rights were waived with full
knowledge of those rights, and that the terms of the agreement were not damaging to
the interests of the party against whom enforcement was sought. 46 This interpretive
standard combined with the prevalence of competing standards for interpreting
prenuptial agreements culminated in the creation of the UPAA.47
According to commentators, the UPAA has achieved uniform treatment in
enforcement of prenuptial agreements in many parts of the United States since its
enactment.48 They contend that “the UPAA provides for the full enforcement of
prenuptial agreements as created by their signatories excepting but two
37

Scherer v. Scherer, 292 S.E.2d 662, 639 (Ga. 1982).

38

See Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 511 (determining an agreement’s substantive fairness by
considering the parties’ changed circumstances).
39

In re Moore’s Estate, 307 P.2d 483, 488 (Or. 1957).

40

Id. at 489.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 492.

43

Id. at 488.

44

See id.

45

Lesson & Pierson, supra note 35, at 370.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.
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circumstances.”49 However, while states that have adopted the UPAA may move
closer toward uniform treatment of prenuptial agreements, the uncertainty of
enforcement still concerns couples who seek enforcement in the twenty-three states
that have not adopted the UPAA.50 Thus, to achieve consistency and uniform treatment
of prenuptial agreements throughout the United States, Ohio also must adopt the
UPAA.
B.

Ohio’s Prenuptial Agreement Laws

In Ohio, prenuptial agreements must meet certain minimum standards of good
faith and fair dealing.51 If the agreement is fair and reasonable under the
circumstances, it will be deemed enforceable.52 Such agreements are valid and
enforceable if three basic conditions are met: “one, they have been entered into freely
without fraud, duress, coercion or overreaching; two, if there was a full disclosure, or
full knowledge, and understanding, of the nature, value and extent of the prospective
spouse's property; and, three, if the terms do not promote or encourage divorce or
profiteering by divorce.”53 For the first element, a presumption of overreaching or
coercion in a prenuptial agreement arises when there is “unfairness or inequity in the
result of the agreement or in its procurement.” 54 The agreement satisfies the second
element when the parties attach as an exhibit the parties’ assets, or alternatively, when
other instrumentalities demonstrate that the parties gave a full disclosure. 55 The third
element is present when “the prenuptial agreement provides a significant sum by way
of either property settlement or alimony at the time of divorce and after a short period
of time, one of the parties abandons the marriage or disregards their vows.” 56 Thus,
these premarital laws govern the court’s analysis in a judicial proceeding to interpret
the validity of a prenuptial agreement.57

49

Id. Those two circumstances, listed in the Prefatory Note of the UPAA, are as follows:

[I]f the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that (a) he or she did not
execute the agreement voluntarily or that (b) the agreement was unconscionable when
it was executed and, before execution of the agreement, he or she (1) was not provided
a fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other
party, (2) did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any right to disclosure of
the property or financial obligations of the other party beyond the disclosure provided,
and (3) did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an adequate knowledge of the
property and financial obligations of the other party.
UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT prefatory n. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
50

See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT prefatory n. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).

51

Zimmie v. Zimmie, 464 N.E.2d 142, 146 (Ohio 1984).

52 Id. (first citing Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 504 (Ohio 1984); then citing Hook v.
Hook, 431 N.E.2d 667 (Ohio 1982)).
53

Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 506.

54

Harbom v. Harbom, 760 A.2d 272, 275 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).

55

Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 506.

56

Id.

57

Id.
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Ohio has several additional procedural requirements to execute a valid prenuptial
agreement. First, couples have a duty to disclose all assets—including property,
money, and personal debts.58 Second, Ohio law requires at least two witnesses present
when a couple signs their prenuptial agreement. 59 Third, “[t]he presentation of an
agreement a very short time before the wedding ceremony will create a presumption
of overreaching or coercion if the postponement of the wedding would cause
significant hardship, embarrassment or emotional stress”60 because courts want
prospective spouses to have time to “contemplate the seriousness of the agreement and
its legal consequences.”61 Finally, “all issues related to child support, custody and
visitation included in a prenuptial agreement will not be enforced by the court . . .
because these issues are decided by the court based upon what is in the child’s best
interest.”62 The court will equitably distribute the couple’s property if it renders a
prenuptial agreement unenforceable; “the court will divide . . . marital property in a
manner that it deems fair, but not necessarily equal.” 63 Accordingly, in Ohio, the
aforementioned substantive and procedural rules create valid prenuptial agreements
that courts are bound to uphold.
C.

The UPAA’s Governing Rules for Prenuptial Agreements

Other jurisdictions incorporated valuable principles from the UPAA by enacting
prenuptial agreement legislation. Section Two of the UPAA sets forth formalities
necessary to construct a binding, legal prenuptial agreement.64 Under the UPAA, the
only requirements for a binding prenuptial agreement are that the agreement is in
writing and signed by both parties.65 A few states that adopted the UPAA, however,
require additional formalities, such as “notarization or an acknowledgment for the
agreement to be enforceable.”66
Section Three of the UPAA establishes standards of enforceability for prenuptial
agreements.67 These standards allow prospective spouses to customize an agreement’s
content to include “all subject matters except those that are criminal or

58 Elizabeth
Stock,
Ohio’s
Prenuptial
Agreement
Laws,
LEGALZOOM,
http://info.legalzoom.com/ohios-prenuptial-agreement-laws-25982.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2016).
59

Id.

60

Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, No. 11CA0103-M, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 1121, 2013 WL
1286012, at ¶ 22 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2013) (quoting Fletcher v. Fletcher 628 N.E.2d 1343,
1348 (Ohio 1994)).
61

Stock, supra note 58.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).

66

Amberlynn Curry, The Uniform Premarital Agreement Act and Its Variations
Throughout the States, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 355, 359 (2010).
67

UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
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unconscionable.”68 Moreover, parties may contract to the disposition of property upon
separation; marital dissolution or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an event; the
modification or elimination of spousal support; the choice of law governing the
construction of the agreement; and any other matter, including their personal rights
and obligations not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal
penalty.69
Currently, courts in various jurisdictions disagree on whether prospective spouses
should be permitted to control spousal support provisions in their prenuptial
agreements.70 The UPAA’s position on this issue is that married couples may set forth
spousal support provisions as long as enforcement of spousal support does not leave
one party eligible for public assistance.71
Lastly, Section Six of the UPAA provides that a party may avoid enforcement of
a prenuptial agreement by showing that (1) the agreement was not voluntarily executed
and (2) “the agreement was unconscionable when executed and before execution of
the agreement and, the party was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the
property or financial obligations of the other party.”72 Collectively, the
aforementioned rules govern enforcement of prenuptial agreements in jurisdictions
that have adopted the UPAA.
D.

Two Competing Standards Under Which Courts Analyze the Validity of
Prenuptial Agreements

When interpreting prenuptial agreements in the United States, some jurisdictions
focus their analysis on protecting the vulnerable spouse.73 Such jurisdictions
acknowledge the unique relationship of the parties to the contract and will generally
review the “reasonableness” of the agreement.74 Ohio adheres to this approach. The
Supreme Court of Ohio expressly acknowledged that “[prenuptial] agreements are
contracts and generally the law of contracts applies to their interpretation and
application . . . but [n]evertheless, [Ohio] has recognized that these agreements
68

ULC, Why States Should Adopt UPAA, supra note 19; see generally Unconscionable,
THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/unconscionable (last
visited Aug. 31, 2017) (“In contract law, an unconscionable contract is one that is unjust or
extremely one-sided in favor of the person who has the superior bargaining power”).
69

UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).

70

Id. § 3 cmt.

71

Id. at prefatory n.; but cf. DAWN GRAY & STEPHEN JAMES WAGNER, COMPLEX ISSUES IN
CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW ch. K7.01 (2016 ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 2016) (quoting In re
Marriage of Melissa, 151 Cal. Rptr. 3d 608, 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012)) (arguing that courts
should be free to challenge universal assumptions underlying the “common law rule that
premarital spousal support waivers promote dissolution and for that reason contravene public
policy”).
72

UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983); but cf. Ohio’s
judicially-imposed requirement that parties provide a “full” disclosure of assets, unlike the
UPAA’s requirement of a “reasonable” disclosure. Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 501 (Ohio
1984) (enforcing prenuptial agreement because there was a full disclosure of monetary assets
between the parties).
73

See, e.g., Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343 (Ohio 1994).

74

Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990).
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constitute a special type of contract to which certain special rules apply.”75 Hence,
these “special rules”76 guide Ohio courts in determining whether the prenuptial
agreement “is fair and reasonable under all the facts and circumstances.”77
Other jurisdictions, specifically those that have adopted the UPAA, focus their
analysis on well-settled principles of contract law: “[a]bsent fraud, misrepresentation,
or duress, spouses should be bound by terms of their agreements.” 78 The rationale is
that prenuptial agreements are contracts, and as such, should be evaluated under same
criteria applicable to other types of contracts.79 In analyzing the validity of a prenuptial
agreement, some courts decline to consider whether the parties effectuated reasonable
or good bargains;80 yet, “if a court finds that a [prenuptial agreement] is so one-sided
that it is unjustly unfair to one spouse, the contract could be thrown out.”81 If a
prenuptial agreement favors one party, however, a court will not automatically deem
the agreement “unfair.”82 Generally, courts enforce these agreements in jurisdictions
that adhere to this contract theory of prenuptial agreements as long as one spouse is
left “something.”83 As a result, courts applying the UPAA evaluate prenuptial
agreements under traditional rules of contract law.
E.

The UPMAA’s Framework

The Uniform Law Commission (“ULC”) approved the UPMAA at its annual
conference on July 18, 2012.84 The ULC drafted the Act in response to criticism of
the UPAA, intending the new Act to supersede the UPAA. 85 Critics opined that the
UPAA lacked protection for the vulnerable spouse and that state variations of the
UPAA were significant, preventing uniform treatment of prenuptial agreements. 86
Initially, the UPMAA broadened the scope of the UPAA’s framework. Under the
UPAA, a prenuptial agreement was unenforceable if the parties included a provision
adversely affecting a child’s right to child support.87 In Section Ten of the UPMAA,
75

Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d at 1346 (emphasis added).

76

See id.

77

Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 512.

78

Simeone, 581 A.2d at 165.

79

Id.

80

Id.

81

Thomas Wayne, The Risk of Do-It-Yourself Prenuptial Agreements, LEGALZOOM,
http://info.legalzoom.com/risks-doityourself-prenuptial-agreements-26448.html (last visited
Oct. 16, 2016).
82

Id.

83

Id.

84

McCaffrey, supra note 27, at 10–11.

85

UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT prefatory n. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N

2012).
86 Id. (“Over the years, commentators have offered a variety of criticisms of that Act, many
arguing that it was weighted too strongly in favor of enforcement, and was insufficiently
protective of vulnerable parties”).
87

McCaffrey, supra note 27, at 12.
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the ULC expanded this concept of unenforceable provisions.88 Section Ten instructs
states to invalidate certain provisions, such as clauses that define “the rights and
obligations of the parties regarding child custody, that limit or restrict a remedy
available to a victim of domestic violence, that purport to modify the grounds for a
court-decreed separation or marital dissolution,” or that similarly offend public
policy.89
In addition, Section Nine provides grounds for avoiding enforcement of the
prenuptial agreement.90 Here, the parties to the prenuptial agreement must enter into
the agreement voluntarily, and both parties must have access to independent legal
counsel.91 If the parties lack independent counsel, the agreement must include a notice
of waiver of marital rights, and the parties must have adequately disclosed their
assets.92
The UPMAA gives courts discretion to invalidate a provision of a prenuptial
agreement if unconscionable at the time of signing.93 In contrast, under the UPAA,
“unconscionability provides a basis for refusal to enforce an agreement only if the
party against whom the agreement is being enforced did not have fair and reasonable
disclosure of the property and financial obligations of the other party.” 94 Thus, the
UPMAA’s framework affords more protection for vulnerable spouses by expanding
the UPAA’s concepts of unenforceability and grounds for avoiding enforcement.
III. PROOF OF CLAIM
A.

Ohio’s Common Law Rules Regulating the Enforcement of Prenuptial
Agreements

In 1984, the Supreme Court of Ohio issued written opinions for two prenuptial
agreement cases. The first, Zimmie v. Zimmie,95 involved William and Kathryn
Zimmie, who married in 1963 after executing a prenuptial agreement.96 In 1977, Mrs.
Zimmie filed for divorce, alleging extreme cruelty and gross neglect. 97 Mr. Zimmie
filed counterclaims on the same grounds and further alleged that the couple’s
prenuptial agreement precluded Mrs. Zimmie’s claims for alimony and division of
property.98 The trial court found the prenuptial agreement invalid as a matter of law
“on the basis that there had not been a full disclosure of assets by the defendant and
there was insufficient evidence to show that the wife had knowledge as to the amount
88

Id.

89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Zimmie v. Zimmie, 464 N.E.2d 142, 142 (Ohio 1984).

96

Id. at 143.

97

Id.

98

Id. at 144.
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of such assets.”99 The court concluded that Mrs. Zimmie entered into the agreement
involuntarily and awarded her $1,425,000, “payable in installments over a period of
nineteen years, or until her death, remarriage or cohabitation . . . as a combination of
sustenance alimony and division of property.” 100
The issue raised on appeal was whether the trial court erred in declaring the
prenuptial agreement unenforceable.101 The appellate court began its analysis by
formulating well-settled principles of marital law:
Although [prenuptial] agreements are not per se invalid, they must meet
certain minimum standards of good faith and fair dealing. If the agreement
is fair and reasonable under the circumstances, it will be deemed
enforceable. The prospective spouse must be fully and accurately apprised
of the nature, value, and extent of the property affected by the agreement,
and must enter into it voluntarily.102
Applying law to facts, the court inferred that Mrs. Zimmie first saw the agreement
on the eve of the wedding and that the parties did not discuss the terms of the
agreement beforehand.103 Moreover, the court found that Mrs. Zimmie signed the
agreement at her husband’s attorney’s office without reading its entire content.104 Mrs.
Zimmie testified that no one informed her that signing the agreement waived her
marital rights to Mr. Zimmie’s property and that Mr. Zimmie failed to disclose to her
the value of his corporate assets.105 Furthermore, she testified that she felt obligated to
sign the agreement.106 As a result, the court found sufficient “evidence . . . to support
the conclusion that [Mrs. Zimmie] did not voluntarily enter into the agreement with a
full disclosure of the defendant's financial worth.” 107 Thus, the court refused to hold
that the trial court erred in this matter. 108
In Ohio, judges focus on the procedural fairness of prenuptial agreements or the
circumstances surrounding their execution. 109 Courts in many states require evidence
of procedural fairness before courts will validate a prenuptial agreement;110 however,
99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Id. at 146.

102

Id.

103

Id.

104

Id.

105

Id.

106

Id.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 147.

109

“Procedural unconscionability is about the actions of the parties and not about the actual
operation of the agreement.” Paul Bennet Marrow, Squeezing Subjectivity from the Doctrine of
Unconscionability, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 187, 193 (2005).
110 See Stewart v. Stewart, 76 A.3d 1221, 1223 (Md. 2013) (“The prevailing view is that
both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be present in order for a court to
invalidate a contractual term as unconscionable”); but see Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162,
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courts disagree on what exigent circumstances suffice to establish procedural
unconscionability.111 Under the UPAA, issues of procedural unconscionability in
prenuptial agreements are questions of law for the courts to decide.112 Adoption of the
UPAA, in Ohio and all other states, would, at minimum, require judges to scrutinize
prenuptial agreements for procedural unconscionability. To promote uniformity, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws may amend the
UPAA’s guidelines for courts to better define what constitutes procedural
unconscionability for purposes of the Act. 113 Although some critics claim Ohio’s
common law treatment of prenuptial agreements already conforms to the UPAA’s
enforcement requirements of procedural fairness, this argument is insufficient. 114
Ohio’s adoption of the UPAA would promote uniformity by requiring courts to
scrutinize prenuptial agreements for procedural fairness without significantly altering
Ohio’s prenuptial agreement laws.
In Gross v. Gross,115 Thomas and Jane Gross executed a prenuptial agreement
before they married in September of 1968.116 The parties’ agreement limited Mrs.
Gross’s alimony to $200 per month for a period of ten years. 117 The agreement also
stipulated that she was not entitled to any division of Mr. Gross’s property nor to any
expense money or counsel fees in connection with any separation or divorce.118 Mrs.
Gross agreed to waive any and all such rights in the agreement119 and signed the final
version of the agreement against the advice of her counsel.120
Twelve years later, Mrs. Gross filed for divorce; the court granted the divorce on
grounds of extreme cruelty attributable to Mr. Gross.121 Evidence adduced at trial
indicated that Mr. Gross “increased his total assets to $8,000,000 with a net equity of
171 (Pa. 1990) (declining to review whether the prenuptial agreement was substantively fair,
but upholding the agreement where it is procedurally conscionable).
111

For example, compare Simeone, 581 A.2d at 166, in which one court refused to render
the prenuptial agreement void merely because the wife did not obtain independent legal counsel,
with In re Marriage of Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506, 518 (Iowa 2008), in which another court
explained several factors to be considered when determining procedural unconscionability,
including the opportunity to seek independent legal counsel.
112

UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).

113 See generally UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT prefatory n. (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2012) (discussing the inconsistencies among the states’ various legal standards
for premarital and marital agreements enforced by state courts).
114 See generally Randolph Carl Oppenheimer, The Antenuptial Contract in Ohio, 28 CAS.
W. RES. L. REV. 1040 (1978) (explaining the long history behind the procedural shortcomings
in Ohio premarital contract enforcement).
115

Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 501 (Ohio 1984).

116

Id. at 503.

117

Id.

118

Id.

119

Id.

120

Id. at 502.

121

Id.
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$6,000,000.”122 In addition, his gross income for the year 1980 was approximately
$250,000.123 The trial court upheld the prenuptial agreement as valid and enforceable
because Mr. Gross fully disclosed his assets, and none of the evidence demonstrated
fraud, duress, or misrepresentation.124 The appellate court found that “inasmuch as the
divorce had been granted upon the trial court's finding that Mr. Gross had been guilty
of gross neglect of duty, he had thereby breached the [prenuptial] agreement and could
not enforce its provisions against Mrs. Gross.”125 Mr. Gross appealed this decision to
the Supreme Court of Ohio, which held:
[S]uch agreements are valid and enforceable if three basic conditions are
met: one, if they have been entered into freely without fraud, duress,
coercion or overreaching; two, if there was a full disclosure, or full
knowledge, and understanding, of the nature, value and extent of the
prospective spouse's property; and, three, if the terms do not promote or
encourage divorce or profiteering by divorce.126
The court noted that historically, courts treat provisions in prenuptial agreements
relating to division of property and alimony upon the parties’ divorce differently from
other provisions.127 Courts hold such agreements, made in contemplation of divorce,
void as against public policy.128 The court reasoned that “in the last decade and a half
many changes have taken place in the attitudes and mores surrounding marriage and
marital relationships,” and “these changes have altered the public policy view toward
[prenuptial] agreements made in contemplation of a possible divorce.” 129 The court
identified influential factors such as “the greater frequency of divorce and remarriage,
the percentage drop in marriage generally among our citizens . . . [and] the widespread
adoption of some manner of ‘no fault’ divorce laws.”130 The court held the appellate
122

Id. at 503.

123

Id.

124

Id.

125

Id. at 503–04.

126

Id. at 506. Gross defined “overreaching” under the first condition as “used in the sense
of one party by artifice or cunning, or by significant disparity to understand the nature of the
transaction, to outwit or cheat the other.” Id. Parties satisfy the second condition by exhibiting
an attachment to the prenuptial agreement containing a list of the assets of the parties to the
agreement or by showing there had been a full disclosure by other means. Id. Finally, the third
condition is generally present where the parties enter into “a [prenuptial] agreement which
provides a significant sum either by way of property settlement or alimony at the time of a
divorce, and after the lapse of an undue short period of time one of the parties abandons the
marriage or otherwise disregards the marriage vows.” Id.
127

Id. at 505.

128

Id. One such public policy was “a potential for profitability when one spouse forfeits
marital or conjugal rights.” Id. Under this scenario, divorce is encouraged where a spouse would
profit by monetary means from divorce, contravening the state’s interest in the preservation of
marriage. Id. “Second, the state is virtually a party to every marital contract in that it possesses
a continuing concern in the financial security of divorced or separated persons.” Id.
129

Id.

130

Id.
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court erred in applying a fault-based view in which the breaching party is estopped
from benefiting from his or her wrong. 131 In addition, the court held the antenuptial
provision limiting Mrs. Gross’s spousal support unenforceable because of its
substantive unconscionability.132 The court acknowledged that Mrs. Gross’s standard
of living dramatically changed between when the parties executed the agreement and
when they filed for divorce.133 In so holding, the court reasoned that forcing Mrs.
Gross to return to her prior standard of living could occasion hardship or be extremely
difficult for the former wife.134
In Gross, the judiciary focused on the prenuptial agreement’s substantive fairness.
The court considered the changed economic circumstances of the parties in
determining whether the content of the agreement was substantively fair.135 Such
considerations afford greater protection of a vulnerable spouse. 136 In this respect, the
UPAA differs from Ohio by allowing states to consider an agreement’s substantive
fairness only when the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that he or
she was not provided with a fair and reasonable financial disclosure of the spouse’s
assets.137 This is a higher standard for substantive unconscionability because the court
first must find that the adverse spouse was not provided a fair disclosure of assets
before the court may consider the agreement’s reasonableness.138
Although more exacting, the UPAA’s approach to substantive fairness is more
desirable than Ohio’s approach. Premised upon a theory of contract law, the UPAA
treats premarital agreements as contracts. Thus, when a party acts deceptively or
withholds facts, the adverse party may raise a defense to have the contract
invalidated.139 Adoption of the UPAA would require Ohio courts to conduct a legal
analysis before performing an equitable one. This would promote uniformity in
premarital agreement law by requiring the party against whom enforcement is sought
to first establish that the disclosure of assets was inadequate before permitting the
131

Id. at 508.

132 Id.; see generally In re Marriage of Shanks, 758 N.W.2d 506, 508 (Iowa 2008) (“The
concept of unconscionability includes both procedural and substantive elements. Procedural
unconscionability generally involves employment of sharp practices, the use of fine print and
convoluted language, as well as a lack of understanding and an inequality of bargaining power.
A substantive unconscionability analysis focuses on the harsh, oppressive, and one-sided terms
of a contract”).
133

Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 510.

134

Id.

135

Id. at 506.

136

Simeone, in adhering to principles of contract law, reasoned that “everyone who enters
into a long-term agreement knows that circumstances can change . . . . If parties choose not to
address such matters in their prenuptial agreements, they must be regarded as having contracted
to bear the risk of events that alter the value of their bargains.” Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d
162, 166 (Pa. 1990). This rule differs from the rule laid down in Gross, which permitted the
court to consider the changed circumstances of the parties in determining whether an agreement
was substantively fair. Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 511.
137

UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).

138

Id.

139

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
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court to perform an equitable analysis; this would provide prospective spouses with a
meaningful opportunity to decide the terms of their marriage and possible divorce
while preventing courts from invalidating provisions absent a showing of a wrong
committed by one party. Such an analysis is appropriate when one considers that the
role of the judiciary is to apply legal principles to facts, 140 not to overreach in their
interpretation of prenuptial agreements by considering whether or not the parties made
a reasonable or fair bargain.
Thus, Ohio should adopt the UPAA because the Act’s approach to substantive
fairness is more suitable for the aforementioned reasons. Adoption of the UPAA in
Ohio and all other states would assist in achieving uniformity in prenuptial agreement
enforcement by preventing courts from considering whether the agreement constitutes
a reasonable bargain absent an initial showing of an inadequate financial disclosure.
B.

Ohio’s Protection of the Vulnerable Spouse Standard

Ohio common law analyzes prenuptial agreements under non-traditional contract
law. Recall that in Part III.A of this Note, Gross held prenuptial agreements
enforceable if they “have been entered into freely without fraud, duress, coercion or
overreaching.”141 The language contained in this rule is analogous to general,
contractual language. For example, it is well-settled that “where allegation[s] of fraud,
mistake, or material misrepresentation are made, extrinsic evidence may be allowed
to interpret language in a written contract which is otherwise plain and
unambiguous.”142 However, Gross found that the spousal support provision contained
in the prenuptial agreement, which limited the former wife’s alimony, was
unconscionable because her standard of living had changed dramatically from the time
that the parties executed the agreement to the time they divorced.143 The court found
the enforcement of the prenuptial agreement unfair because the terms of the agreement
failed to account for changed circumstances during the marriage. 144
Conversely, in jurisdictions that give deference to a party’s freedom to contract, if
parties fail to plan for foreseeable risks such as changed circumstances, courts must
presume the parties contracted to bear these risks.145 However, courts can use changes
in circumstance as rationale for finding a prenuptial agreement invalid.146 Thus, as
portrayed in Gross, a court’s preference for a reasonableness analysis contravenes
principles of contract law because it presumes a failure to address changed
circumstances in a prenuptial agreement is the equivalent of the parties’ conscious
decision to bear the risks of the omission.
In addition, Gross held a prenuptial “contract voluntarily entered into during the
period of engagement . . . valid when the provision for the [spouse] is fair and
140
Vitalius Tumonis, Legal Realism & Judicial Decision-Making, 12 JURIS. 1362, 1362
(2012).
141

Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 506.

142 6 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN ET AL., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 25.20 (Joseph M. Perillo et
al. eds., 2017).
143

Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 510.

144

Id.

145

See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 166 (Pa. 1990).

146

Gross, 464 N.E.2d at 510.
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reasonable under all the facts and circumstances.”147 These facts and circumstances
could “exist when the disinherited spouse has substantial wealth of his or her own and
the deceased spouse had children from a prior marriage who would be natural
claimants to his or her bounty.”148 Yet, as previously stated, the Supreme Court of
Ohio acknowledged that “[prenuptial] agreements are contracts and generally the law
of contracts applies to their interpretation and application”; however, “these
agreements constitute a special type of contract to which certain special rules
apply.”149 Although part of Gross’s holding is synonymous with contract law, the
court’s analysis better aligns with jurisdictions that focus upon the reasonableness of
the agreement, thereby protecting the economically disadvantaged party.
Zimmie analyzed the enforceability of a prenuptial agreement by emphasizing the
temporal element, as the former wife first saw the agreement on the eve of the
wedding, the absence of the former wife's independent counsel, and her testimony that
she felt obligated to sign the agreement.150 In Zimmie, the court “voided the prenuptial
contract for procedural unconscionability, [upon] finding that . . . the wife saw the
prenuptial contract for the first time only one day prior to the wedding.” 151 Yet, in
Simeone, the court rejected the idea of evaluating the agreement’s conscionability, as
“[c]ontracting parties are normally bound by their agreements, without regard to
whether the terms thereof were read and fully understood and irrespective of whether
the agreements embodied reasonable or good bargains.”152 Hence, in jurisdictions that
purport to protect the vulnerable spouse, courts should consider the circumstances
surrounding the execution of prenuptial agreements as well as whether the
agreement’s terms are reasonable given the positions of the parties. Zimmie’s analysis
falls within the ambit of such.
Some jurisdictions legally recognize the protection of the vulnerable spouse;
however, the drafters of the UPAA, along with twenty-seven states, prefer to root
judicial inquiries in the principles of freedom to contract.153 To achieve consistency in
premarital agreement law, states must adopt a single, uniform standard. The discrete
outcomes in these differing standards place the validity of prenuptial agreements in
jeopardy whenever couples move to new jurisdictions. For Ohioans, the UPAA and
its contractual freedom approach is appealing, especially because the Supreme Court
of Ohio expressly acknowledged that prenuptial agreements are ordinary contracts. 154
147

Id. at 512 (Brown, J., concurring) (quoting Juhasz v. Juhasz, 16 N.E.2d 328 (Ohio 1938)).

148

Id. (citing Hook v. Hook, 431 N.E.2d 667 (Ohio 1982)).

149

Fletcher v. Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1346 (Ohio 1994) (emphasis added).

150

Zimmie v. Zimmie, 464 N.E.2d 142, 146 (Ohio 1984).

151

Joline F. Sikaitis, A New Form of Family Planning? The Enforceability of No-Child
Provisions in Prenuptial Agreements, 54 CATH. U.L. REV. 355, 358 n.143 (2004); see also Larry
A. DiMatteo, Equity’s Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the Twentieth Century’s
Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 New Eng. L. Rev. 265, 293 (1999) (“The doctrine
of unconscionability has provided the means by which courts can begin to perform fairness
analysis of the substance of the contractual exchange”).
152

Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990).

153

LINDA J. RAVDIN, PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND NEGOTIATIONS 8 (2d ed.

2017).
154

Fletcher, 628 N.E.2d at 1346.
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As stated infra, to achieve consistency and uniform treatment of prenuptial
agreements, states like Ohio must conform to the majority approach, giving deference
to the contractual freedom of prospective spouses.
C.

The UPAA’s Contractual Freedom Focus as the Appropriate Standard

Ohio should adopt the UPAA because the Act’s general approach affords parties
freedom, within broad limits, to choose the financial terms of their marriage and
divorce.155 This standard incorporates well-settled principles of contract law, i.e.
absent fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, spouses should be bound by the terms of
their agreements.156 Under this approach, prenuptial agreements are contracts, and
courts should evaluate the agreements under the same criteria applicable to other types
of contracts.157 Not all early adopters of the UPAA stringently adhere to such an
approach.158 For example, Connecticut recognizes that “although a prenuptial
agreement is a type of contract and must, therefore, comply with ordinary principles
of contract law, the validity of such a contract depends on the circumstances of the
particular case.”159 Although a majority of early adopter states slightly varied their
enforcement standards for prenuptial agreements, their governing analyses are
generally premised upon well-settled principles of contract law.
Thus, to gain acceptance, the UPAA must establish first that it adheres to the
contractual freedom standard.160 Section Three of the UPAA provides strong support
for the assertion that the UPAA’s general approach is that parties are free to negotiate
the terms of their marriage and divorce.161 This Section regulates the content of
prenuptial agreements.162 The only matters excluded from its scope are criminal or
unconscionable matters.163 Under this Section, parties may freely contract to the
disposition of property upon separation; the marital dissolution or the occurrence or
nonoccurrence of an event; the modification or elimination of spousal support; the
choice of law governing the construction of the agreement; and any other matter,
including the parties’ personal rights and obligations not in violation of public policy
or a statute imposing a criminal penalty. 164 Logic dictates that in mandating minimal
restrictions, the UPAA has implicitly affirmed a spouse’s right to contractual freedom.
In addition, Section Two of the UPAA defines the marriage as consideration for a

155

UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).

156

Simeone, 581 A.2d at 165.

157

Id.

158

Bedrick v. Bedrick, 17 A.3d 17 (Conn. 2011).

159

Id. at 25.

160

Chelsea Biemiller, The Uncertain Enforceability of Prenuptial Agreements: Why the
“Extreme” Approach in Pennsylvania Is the Right Approach for Review, 6 DREXEL L. REV. 133,
148 (2013).
161

UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).

162

Id.

163

ULC, Why States Should Adopt UPAA, supra note 19.

164

UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).
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prenuptial agreement.165 Consideration, as a basic tenant of contract law, 166 lends
further support to the notion that the UPAA intended for courts to consider and
evaluate prenuptial agreements as ordinary contracts. Furthermore, the UPAA
expressly states that “a premarital agreement is a contract,” and the provisions
contained within the Act “may be enforced to the extent that they are enforceable . . .
under otherwise applicable law.”167 Thus, the UPAA takes the position that prenuptial
agreements are ordinary contracts that courts should enforce pursuant to traditional
contract law.
Accordingly, states that have adopted the UPAA agree that prenuptial agreements
are ordinary contracts.168 Also, other states, like Pennsylvania, that have yet to adopt
the UPAA require that prenuptial agreements “be evaluated under the same criteria as
are applicable to other types of contracts.”169 Hence, the prevailing view is that courts
should analyze prenuptial agreements under traditional contract law.
In Reed v. Reed,170 the court expressed a convincing argument supporting the
contractual freedom standard. In Reed, the appellate court overturned the trial court’s
ruling that the prenuptial agreement was void given the length of the parties’ marriage
and the growth of the parties’ assets over the years. 171 The appellate court found that
“the parties’ prenuptial agreement [was] clear and unambiguous, [and that] changed
circumstances [did] not render its enforcement unfair and unreasonable.”172 Justifying
its decision, the court cited well-settled principles of prenuptial agreement law, stating,
“[c]ourts cannot make contracts. They can only construe them . . . . In keeping with
this principle, it necessarily follows that parties who negotiate and ratify [prenuptial]
agreements should do so with the confidence that their expressed intent will be upheld
and enforced by the courts.”173 The court in Reed opined that the contractual freedom
standard was appropriate because courts are not in the business of making contracts.174
Instead, courts should enforce prenuptial agreements in accordance with the terms set
forth by the parties.175 Arguably, when a court invalidates a prenuptial agreement
because it is substantively “unfair,” the court is substituting its judgment for that of
the parties.176 Thus, by invalidating freely and voluntarily executed prenuptial
agreements effectuated by competent and consenting adults for any reason other than
165

Id. § 2.

166 2 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN ET AL., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §5.2 (Joseph M. Perillo et al.
eds., 2017).
167

UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 2 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).

168

RAVDIN, supra note 153, at 8–9.

169 Raiken v. Mellon, 582 A.2d 11, 11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); see Simeone v. Simeone, 581
A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990).
170

Reed v. Reed, 693 N.W.2d 825, 836 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).

171

Id. at 833.

172

Id. at 836.

173

Id. at 835–36.

174

Id. at 835.

175

Id.

176

See, e.g., id.
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grave violations of public policy or criminal acts, the court is “making” or modifying
an otherwise valid contract. This is an inappropriate act or role of the judiciary.
In addition, as stated supra, the contractual freedom standard is appropriate
because marriage, itself, is recognized as a contract.177 Execution of a marriage
contract creates a personal and legal relationship between the parties, 178 and the law
intervenes to hold these parties to various obligations and liabilities.179 If courts
consider marriage a contract by which parties acquire enforceable, legal obligations,
logically, courts should consider and evaluate premarital agreements as contracts as
well.
Within the ambit of social progress, the contractual freedom standard is more
appropriate, especially given the improved status of women as equals in modern
society.180 Indeed, “[i]n other areas, the law has developed to assume that all similarly
situated people, regardless of gender, stand on equal footing and should receive equal
treatment under the law . . . . [Therefore, the law] should do the same for those
individuals about to enter into marriage.”181 The standard embraced by Ohio,
protecting the vulnerable spouse, undermines women’s status as equal marital partners
capable of contracting.182 Likewise, courts “run the risk of paternalism by recognizing
that the achievement of gender equality requires more than equal treatment—it may
demand protection of women as a disadvantaged socioeconomic class.” 183 Although
in the past women commonly relied on their husbands to provide for them
financially,184 the number of women in the workforce has greatly increased. 185 Thus,
the protection of the vulnerable spouse treats women as incapable of contracting
voluntarily and “presumes that women [are] unable to understand the contracts they
sign.”186 This standard suggests that “[w]omen are less powerful than men and need
societal protection in the form of voiding the bargains they strike.” 187 This obsolete
177 But cf. Maynard v. Hill, 128 U.S. 190, 210–11 (1988) (“[W]hilst marriage is often termed
by text writers and in decisions of courts a civil contract—generally to indicate that it must be
founded upon the agreement of the parties, and does not require any religious ceremony for its
solemnization—it is something more than a mere contract”).
178

See id. at 211.

179

Id.

180

See Biemiller, supra note 160, at 166.

181

Id.

182 Gail Frommer Brod, Premarital Agreements & Gender Justice, 6 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
229, 232 (1994).
183 Id.; but see Pre-nuptial Agreement—A Feminist Issue?, U. EXETER’S INTERDISC. ACAD.
J. (2014), http://www.theundergraduateexeter.com/2014/03/pre-nuptial-agreement-feministissue/ (arguing that commentators have rejected feminist-based theories of prenuptial by
asserting that prenuptial agreements generally disadvantage women because women often fall
victim to the gender wage gap).
184

Cf. Brod, supra note 182, at 232.

185

Cf. id.

186

Lisa Milot, Restricting the American Marital Quilt: Untangling Marriage from the
Nuclear Family, 87 VA. L. REV. 701, 715 (2001).
187

Id. at 715.
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standard threatens to dissipate considerable advances and modern progress made in
the area of women’s rights—namely, the recognition of women as equals.
To achieve consist and uniform treatment of prenuptial agreements, all states
should adopt the UPAA standard for analyzing prenuptial agreements. This
proposition becomes compelling when one considers the inherent difference in
analyses and subsequent outcomes that flow from inconsistent standards.188 Ohio
should conform to the views of a majority of states and adopt the UPAA’s contractual
freedom standard to reduce ambiguity and promote reliable interpretations for
prenuptial agreements in all jurisdictions.
D.

Practical Issues with Competing Standards

Ohio should adopt the UPAA’s contractual freedom standard. Competing
standards for analyzing prenuptial agreements present practical problems for
prospective spouses attempting to draft valid and binding agreements that are able to
withstand judicial scrutiny in multiple jurisdictions. In In re Marriage of Rahn, a
couple effectuated a prenuptial agreement in another state and sought to enforce it in
Colorado.189 Under Colorado law, “if a prenuptial agreement was entered into in good
faith, with full and fair disclosure, and without fraud or overreaching, the agreement
was held to be valid and enforceable.”190 Mrs. Rahn sought to invalidate the agreement
because her husband failed to disclose the value or existence of his pension plan. 191
Instead, the court found in her husband’s favor and upheld the prenuptial agreement,
finding Mrs. Rahn had general knowledge of his assets.192
This case exemplifies some of the issues created from competing standards of
enforceability, as the parties executed a prenuptial agreement in one state and
subsequently sought enforcement in another. An Ohio court would likely have
invalidated the prenuptial agreement at issue in In re Marriage of Rahn if Mrs. Rahn
gave credible testimony that she did not receive a full and accurate disclosure of her
husband’s assets.193 Such conflicting outcomes “subject the parties to the risk that the
validity and enforceability of their contract will be judged by standards and rules that
did not exist in the state where the contract was drafted.”194
Similarly, in In re Marriage of Bonds,195 Barry Bonds, a professional baseball
player, and Sun, his Swedish wife, married in Las Vegas, Nevada in 1988.196 In 1987,
Sun moved to Arizona to live with Barry. 197 The morning before their flight to Las
188

See discussion infra Part III.D.

189

In re Marriage of Rahn, 914 P.2d 463, 465 (Colo. App. 1995).

190

Id.

191

Id.

192

Id.

193

Ohio law requires “full disclosure [of assets] or full knowledge and understanding of the
nature, value, and extent of the prospective spouse's property.” 46 OHIO JUR. 3D Family Law §
156 (2017).
194

19 SCOTT J. HORENSTEIN, WASH. PRAC. FAM. AND CMTY PROP. L. § 16:5 (2015).

195

In re Marriage of Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).

196

Id. at 787.

197

Id.
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Vegas, the couple met with Barry’s attorney and signed a prenuptial agreement 198
containing a complete waiver of spousal support.199 Moreover, Sun was not
represented by independent legal counsel.200 At the time of the divorce proceedings,
the couple lived in California where Sun was a stay-at-home mother of their two
children; Barry was earning $8,000,000 annually as a professional baseball player. 201
Prior to trial, the court considered whether Arizona or California law should govern
the interpretation of the prenuptial agreement. 202 The trial court declined to apply
California law upon concluding “that the parties could not have anticipated that they
were going to live in California.”203 The trial court subsequently enforced the
prenuptial agreement.204 The appellate court reversed, however, applying California
law and holding that under the totality of the circumstances, the prenuptial agreement
was invalid.205 The Supreme Court of California was silent on the appellate court’s
choice of law ruling,206 but held that the prenuptial agreement was valid except for the
waiver of spousal support, which was unenforceable pursuant to California public
policy.207
In re marriage of Bonds illustrates the pragmatic concerns underlying choice-oflaw issues that courts must face when deciding which law to apply to enforce
prenuptial agreements executed in another state. Under Ohio law, courts would likely
invalidate the prenuptial agreement in Bonds due to the inequality of bargaining power
between the parties coupled with the absence of independent legal counsel for the
former wife.208 An Ohio court would have applied Arizona law to the Bonds’
prenuptial agreement because Ohio’s choice-of-law rules provide: “in the absence of
an effective choice by the parties, the Second Restatement requires application of a
most significant relationship test.”209 Thus, if an Ohio court determined that the parties
had a significant relationship with the State of Arizona, then Arizona law would
govern the interpretation of the prenuptial agreement. Adoption of the UPAA in all
states would minimize the effect that choice-of-law determinations have on prenuptial
198

Id. at 788.

199

Id. at 789.

200

Id.

201

Id.

202

Id.

203

Id.

204

Id.

205

Id. at 783.

206

In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 823 (2000).

207

Id. at 838.

208
Although independent counsel is not a requirement to enforce a prenuptial agreement
under Ohio law, the Court in Zimmie would have likely given great deference to this fact coupled
with the former wife’s Swedish heritage and possible language barrier. See Zimmie v. Zimmie,
464 N.E.2d 142 (Ohio 1984).
209 Sonja H. Haller, Ohio Choice-of-Law Rules: A Guide to the Labyrinth, 44 OHIO ST. L.J.
239, 247 (1983). The significant relationship test is the application of the law with the “most
significant relationship to the event and the parties.” Id.
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agreement interpretations because each state would apply the same uniform
standard.210
This is significant because the primary reason choice-of-law determinations are
repeatedly at issue in prenuptial agreements is because the applicable state law often
changes the outcome of the proceeding.211 The obliteration of competing standards
and subsequent adoption of the UPAA will enable couples to effectuate binding
premarital contracts, guaranteeing consistent enforcement across state lines.
E.

The UPAA Incorporates Accepted Standards of State Laws

Ohio should adopt the UPAA because the Act incorporates accepted standards of
existing state laws. For example, Section Three of the UPAA regulates the content of
prenuptial agreements.212 As stated supra, nothing is excluded from the scope of the
agreement except matters that are criminal or unconscionable.213 Every state prohibits
prospective spouses from contracting to anything illegal in the prenuptial
agreement.214 Hence, the UPAA’s regulation of prenuptial agreement content,
although liberal in nature, is uniformly practiced in every state.
A significant number of states permit parties to include a provision to modify or
eliminate spousal support; however, the rules vary as to the limitations imposed on
such provisions.215 Under the UPAA, a provision that modifies or eliminates a
spouse’s right to spousal support will be invalidated if enforcement of the provision
would leave one party destitute.216 The test is “whether, within a reasonable period of
time following the divorce, it is probable . . . that the deprived spouse will become a
public charge if the limitation or waiver of alimony is enforced.”217 California and
South Dakota are the only two states that have eliminated this section from their

210

This argument is advanced in the preceding paragraph.

211

Julia McLaughlin, Premarital Agreements and Choice of Law: One, Two, Three, Baby,
You and Me, 72 MO. L. REV. 793, 795 (2007).
212

UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).

213

ULC, Why States Should Adopt UPAA, supra note 19.

214

What Can and Cannot Be Included in Prenuptial Agreements, FINDLAW.COM,
http://family.findlaw.com/marriage/what-can-and-cannot-be-included-in-prenuptialagreements.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
215

See, e.g., Gant v. Gant, 329 S.E.2d 106, 116 (W.Va. 1985) (holding that a prenuptial
agreement concerning waiver of alimony was enforceable and presumptively valid, despite the
fact that prenuptial agreements are disfavored). In Ohio, courts permit parties to a prenuptial
agreement to contract to matters relating to spousal support, but “a party may challenge the
spousal support provisions contained therein by demonstrating that the terms related to spousal
support are unconscionable at the time of the divorce.” Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, No.
13CA0084-M, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 3589, 2014 WL 4179486, at ¶ 5 (Ohio Ct. App., Medina
County, Aug. 25, 2014) (first quoting Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, No. 11CA0103-M, 2013 Ohio
App. LEXIS 1121, 2013 WL 1286012, at ¶ 39 (Ohio Ct. App., Medina County, Mar. 27, 2013);
then citing Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 501 (Ohio 1984)).
216

See Susan Wolfson, Premarital Waiver of Alimony, 38 FAM L.Q. 141, 145 (2004).

217

O’Daniel v. O’Daniel, 419 S.W.3d 280, 281 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2017

23

238

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:215

versions of the UPAA.218 “However, California case law indicates that spousal support
waivers are not contrary to public policy and are not per se void or unenforceable.” 219
Conversely, some states prohibit waiver of spousal support provisions on the
theory that such provisions encourage divorce and are void as against public policy. 220
Nevertheless, several states still permit spouses to contract to such spousal support
provisions.221 The UPAA adopts accepted state standards governing spousal support
provisions within prenuptial agreements.
In addition, Section Six of the UPAA provides grounds for avoiding enforcement
of a prenuptial agreement.222 First, premarital agreements are not enforceable if the
party against whom enforcement is sought proves that the parties did not enter into the
agreement voluntarily.223 This requirement is another accepted standard in all states.224
For example, Ohio “requires that the agreement be freely entered into without fraud,
duress, coercion or overreaching.” 225 This language is analogous to the language in
Section Six of the UPAA, which states “an agreement remains unenforceable if the
attacking party proves, by the preponderance of the evidence, it was not voluntary, or
was the product of fraud, duress, coercion, or overreaching.”226 Hence, the
requirement that parties voluntarily execute prenuptial agreements is an accepted
standard of enforcement in all states.
Ohio is among a significant minority in its interpretation of prenuptial
agreements.227 Arguably, Ohio and similar jurisdictions possess second-tier views to
the corresponding governing standards. Inevitably, all states, upon recognizing the
importance of uniform treatment of prenuptial agreements, will have to compromise
on which standards and principles should govern. Such a compromise is essential to
ensure preservation of the rights of spouses to contract freely in prenuptial agreements.
The wisdom of twenty-seven state legislatures reinforces the widespread acceptance
of the UPAA’s standards. Therefore, adopting these accepted standards would allow
uniform treatment and consistent outcomes in the enforcement of prenuptial
agreements, providing adequate and reliable guidance for judicial interpretation of
prenuptial agreements.

218

Wolfson, supra note 216, at 145.

219

Id.; see CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(c) (2017).

220 Cf. Stratton v. Wilson, 185 S.W.2d 22, 523 (Ky. 1916) (“[T]he law will not permit parties
contemplating marriage to enter into a contract providing for, and looking to, future separation
after marriage”).
221

McCaffrey, supra note 27, at 10.

222

UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).

223

Id.

224

But see In re Marriage of Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 795 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(“Although all states require ‘voluntary’ execution of such contracts, jurisdictions vary
significantly in the standards used to review the validity of prenuptial agreements”).
225

Gross v. Gross, 464 N.E.2d 500, 506 (Ohio 1984).

226

Unif. Premarital Agreement Act § 6 (Unif. Law Comm’n 1983).
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See Curry, supra note 66, at 355.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol66/iss1/10

24

2017]

THE “P” WORD
F.

239

The UPAA Incorporates a Flexible Framework

Another reason why Ohio should adopt the UPAA is because the Act provides a
flexible framework for interpreting prenuptial agreements. The UPAA’s flexible
framework allows states to make minor modifications prior to enacting their own
versions of the UPAA.228 For example, regarding child support provisions, the UPAA
states that a prenuptial agreement may not adversely affect the right to child support.229
Utah’s modification of this section provides that “in addition to the right to child
support not being adversely affected by a premarital agreement, the medical insurance,
the health and medical provider expenses, and the child-care coverage cannot be
affected by such an agreement.”230 Connecticut added a discretionary clause to its
version of the UPAA, stating that “any provision relating to the custody, visitation,
and care or any other statement affecting a child shall be subject to judicial review and
modification.”231 Currently, in Ohio, “all issues related to child support, custody and
visitation included in a prenuptial agreement will not be enforced by the court . . .
because these issues are decided by the court based upon what is in the child’s best
interest.”232 The Act’s flexible framework would allow the Ohio Legislature to craft
its own version of the UPAA, similar to Connecticut’s version, subjecting child
support provisions in prenuptial agreements to judicial review. Ultimately, as more
states adopt the UPAA, Ohio will have to compromise and defer to the UPAA’s
governing standards.233 However, as demonstrated here, Ohio can preserve some of
its common law principles without hindering the uniform application of the UPAA
across state lines.
Many states have adopted modified versions of the UPAA; yet, these states still
adhere to the Act’s general framework. For example, California requires “fair,
reasonable and full disclosure of the property or financial obligations of the other
party.”234 The UPAA “requires only ‘fair and reasonable disclosure.’” 235 Thus,
“[u]nder the UPAA, less than full disclosure might be acceptable.”236 Similarly,
Illinois “allows for a provision of the premarital agreement dealing with the
modification or elimination of support to be changed by a court to avoid the party
against whom enforcement is sought from suffering undue hardship.”237 Finally, the
Indiana version of the UPAA implies that although a “premarital agreement that
228

Id. at 356.

229

Id. at 357 (citing UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983)).

230

Id. at 381 (citing UTAH CODE § 30-8-4(2) (2008)).

231

Id. at 363 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-36d(c) (2008)).

232

Stock, supra note 58.

233 See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT prefatory n. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983); see
also ULC, Why States Should Adopt UPAA, supra note 19.
234

Curry, supra note 66, at 362 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(a)(2)(A) (2009)).

235

Id. (quoting UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(a)(2)(i) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1983)).
236 Id. (first citing UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983);
then citing CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615 (2009)).
237

Id. at 367; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/1–10/11 (2017).
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causes one spouse to be forced onto public assistance may be unconscionable, a better
test for unconscionability is to compare the situations of both parties.”238 Overall, the
UPAA’s flexible framework provides Ohio with the unique opportunity to merge
traditional Ohio prenuptial agreement principles with the UPAA, thereby contributing
to the uniform application of prenuptial agreement law across state lines.
G.

The UPAA Promotes Uniformity

Ohio should adopt the UPAA because the Act promotes uniform enforcement of
prenuptial agreements. The ULC, in promulgating the UPMAA, explained that the
UPAA “brought . . . consistency to the legal treatment of premarital agreements,” but
ultimately concluded that “uniformity has declined as states have amended the act in
various ways throughout the years.”239 Despite its variations, the UPAA continues to
promote uniformity because it eliminates the existence of diametrically opposed
standards and adopts a more uniform approach—the contractual freedom standard.240
Continuing this abolition of competing standards will eradicate the need for courts to
constantly assess substantive fairness because, under the UPAA, states may consider
the substantive fairness of the agreement only when the party against whom
enforcement is sought proves that he or she was not provided a fair and reasonable
financial disclosure.241 Furthermore, adoption of the UPAA will eliminate content
assessments because the UPAA permits parties to contract to a wide range of subject
matters.242 Eventually, adoption of the UPAA could even phase out individual state
content restrictions altogether on terms such as child or spousal support.
The UPAA also promotes uniformity by minimizing splits in authority. For
example, “there is a split in authority among the states as to whether a premarital
agreement may control the issue of spousal support.”243 A growing trend exists where
parties may contractually alter spousal support if certain standards are met.244 As more
states adopt the UPAA, more trends will emerge. Ohio and Connecticut agree that
child support, visitation, and custody are best left to family courts;245 yet, several states
disagree and permit broad freedom to contract provided the right to child support is
not adversely affected.246 Thus, if every state adopts the UPAA, a majority rule will
likely emerge, thereby minimizing splits in authority. As a result, the widespread
adoption of the UPAA would promote uniform treatment of prenuptial agreements.

238 Curry, supra note 66, at 368 (citing Rider v. Rider, 669 N.E.2d 160, 164 (Ind. 1996));
see IND. CODE §31-11-3-8 (2017).
239

ULC, Summary, supra note 33.

240

See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 6 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).

241

Id. § 6.

242

See id. § 1 cmt.

243

Id. § 3.

244

Id.

245

See Curry, supra note 66, at 355.

246

Id. at 357.
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IV. CONFRONTING THE COUNTERARGUMENT: STATES WILL BE RELUCTANT TO
ADOPT THE UPMAA
As stated supra, the ULC approved the UPMAA at its annual conference on July
18, 2012247 after half of the states failed to adopt the UPAA. 248 Commentators have
suggested that the state variations of the UPAA were significant, preventing uniform
treatment of prenuptial agreements across state lines.249 Because states traditionally
governed premarital and marital agreements under separate legal standards, the ULC
sought to unify the interpretation of such agreements under one set of procedures. 250
Some argue that states may have undermined uniformity by modifying and
enacting their own versions of the UPAA; however, scholars refute these claims,
arguing that “many of these changes have no significant impact on [a] state’s adoption
of the UPAA.”251 Consider the Arkansas Premarital Agreement Act, similar to the
UPAA, which requires a prenuptial agreement be in writing and signed by both
parties.252 Unlike the UPAA, Arkansas’s Act also requires “the agreement . . .
be acknowledged by both parties.”253 Florida “allows a premarital agreement to be
held unenforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought can prove the
‘agreement was the product of fraud, duress, coercion or overreaching.’” 254 Florida,
thus, builds upon the UPAA’s general requirement that parties execute prenuptial
agreements voluntarily, enacting additional enforceability requirements that could
render a prenuptial agreement invalid.255 Overall, although many states add
modifications to the UPAA provisions, they have not impeded the uniform application
of the UPAA’s governing standards across state lines.
If one views the UPAA as a safety net, this proposition becomes compelling.
Essentially, the UPAA mandates minimal formal requirements—the agreement must
be in writing and signed by both parties.256 Additional formalities, like Arkansas’s
additional provision, do not change the underlying rules prohibiting parties from orally
executing prenuptial agreements.257 Florida’s inquiry into whether the prenuptial
agreements overreach, similarly, does not hinder the UPAA’s provision requiring
voluntary execution in prenuptial agreements. 258 Voluntariness operates as a safety
net; stated differently, it is the bare minimum required to justify enforcing a prenuptial
247

McCaffrey, supra note 27, at 10.

248

Id. at 11.

249

See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT prefatory n. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).

250

See UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2012).

251

Curry, supra note 66, at 383.

252 Id. at 360 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-402 (2009)); compare UNIF. PREMARITAL
AGREEMENT ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983) with ARK. CODE § 9-11-402 (2017).
253

Curry, supra note 66, at 360 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-402 (2009)).

254

Id. at 366 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 61.079(7)(a)(2) (2017)).

255

Id.; see FLA. STAT. § 61.079(7) (2017).
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agreement. Overreaching operates as an additional factor courts could consider in
determining whether the agreement was sufficiently voluntary.259 Other states have
made similar changes such as rearranging the organizational structure of the UPAA,
modifying provisional language, eliminating subsections, and adding subsections. 260
Despite these variations, the Act’s original provisions remain significantly unharmed
in every manifestation, likely because the UPAA provides such a broad, general
framework for enforcement of prenuptial agreements. 261 Thus, states may continue to
enact their own variations, while the overall framework and substance of the UPAA
protects uniformity.
In the prefatory note of the UPMAA, the ULC said critics attacked the UPAA as
insufficient in its protection of the vulnerable spouse. 262 The UPAA says, in relevant
parts, that “a premarital agreement is a contract,” and the Act’s provisions “may be
enforced to the extent that they are enforceable . . . under otherwise applicable law.” 263
Logically, courts should evaluate a contract under traditional principles of contract
law. Many states have expressed agreement by adopting the UPAA.264 States that
agree with the UPAA’s approach will be reluctant to adopt the UPMAA as the Act’s
revised focus centered around the protection of the vulnerable spouse. 265
Unfortunately, this view would require a significant number of states to alter
materially their prenuptial agreement laws, focusing, instead, on whether an
agreement is substantively fair and includes a reasonable bargain. 266 These goals are
unrealistic; the ULC essentially expects a majority of states to unravel years of
jurisprudence overnight to preserve uniform prenuptial agreement laws. 267
Simultaneously, the commission endorsed two opposing standards contained within
two different prenuptial agreement acts.268 In addition, the UPMAA’s attempts to
bring both marital and premarital agreements into its scope269 decreases the likelihood
that states will adopt it. The ULC, itself, conceded that most states analyze premarital

259

Id.

260

See Curry, supra note 66, at 367; see also id. at 364 (“Indiana changed some of the
organizational structure of the UPAA, even where it did not change the language or meaning of
that section of the act; Connecticut has also kept some of the original UPAA's language”).
261

See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT prefatory n. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1983).

262

UNIF. PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT prefatory n. (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N

2012).
263

UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 1983).

264 See, e.g., Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990) (“Absent fraud,
misrepresentation, or duress, spouses should be bound by the terms of their agreements”).
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See UNIF. PREMARITAL
COMM’N 2012).

AND

MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT prefatory n. (UNIF. LAW.
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Id.
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and marital agreements under entirely different legal standards.270 Regardless, many
of the state variations of the UPAA are insignificant in terms of impact on uniformity.
Thus, Ohio should adopt the UPAA’s accepted state standards, flexible framework,
and contractual freedom approach to prenuptial agreement interpretation.
V. CONCLUSION
In today’s society, emerging awareness among prospective spouses of the need to
settle marital issues between themselves before marriage271 has led to an increase in
prenuptial agreements.272 Couples in the United States commonly live in several states
throughout the course of their marriage.273 Such circumstances have caused individual
states to establish prenuptial agreement laws that differ in both formal and substantive
ways.274 As a result of non-uniform treatment of prenuptial agreements across state
lines,275 the ULC drafted the UPAA as a remedial measure.276 Currently, Ohio remains
one of twenty-three states yet to adopt the UPAA. 277 Ohio’s adoption of the UPAA
would clarify the rights and responsibilities of parties subject to prenuptial
agreements; subsequent adoption of the Act in all states would guarantee reliable
prenuptial agreements which could withstand judicial scrutiny in all jurisdictions.
Moreover, Ohio’s adoption of the UPAA would conform to state precedent. Ohio
law currently adheres to the UPAA’s enforceability requirements—that premarital
agreements are unenforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves
that the parties did not execute the agreement voluntarily or that the agreement was
unconscionable.278 In addition, because of the UPAA’s flexible framework, Ohio
legislatures may create their own version of the UPAA to complement existing Ohio
law.279 The only significant departure from current Ohio law would occur in the
absence of an inadequate disclosure of assets, which, under the UPAA, allows
prenuptial agreements to be invalidated only upon a showing of fraud,
misrepresentation, or duress.280 This departure is a small, legal concession that would
ensure that courts uphold respective intents of parties when dictating crucial terms of
their marriage and divorce. In time, Ohio’s adoption of the UPAA would be a
significant step toward the ultimate goal—adoption of the UPAA across all fifty states.
Nationwide adoption of the UPAA would encourage and permit prospective spouses
wishing to solidify their terms of marriage and divorce to do so through binding and
valid legal instruments.
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